Belgian-Chinese Chamber of Commerce (BCECC)

China Press Review – February 18, 2022

How NPC policymakers can restore confidence in China’s economy and markets
Current stimulus measures are insufficient to boost long-term loans and investment in the real economy amid low private-sector confidence. More accommodative monetary policy and greater regulatory transparency could go a long way to improving investor sentiment   Tax reductions and fee cuts might be put forward as major fiscal policy tools to support the private sector, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises. Meanwhile, local governments’ bond issuance quotas could be raised to provide funds for infrastructure investment. To support fiscal expansion, the central government will be more tolerant of the transitory rise in the country’s deficit. The NPC might approve a fiscal deficit-to-GDP ratio at 3.2 per cent for 2022, the same level as for 2021 but still higher than the historical average.  Although these short-term stabilisation measures will draw the most eyeballs during the NPC, it is worth noting that Chinese policymakers will also seize the opportunity to communicate their long-term reform plans. As the second year of the 14th five-year plan, 2022 will be the year for implementation of development plans across all sectors. High-quality development, including in the domestic technology sector, as well as improvements to the population structure, control of systemic risks, and environmental development, will be among the highlights in the government work report and other legislative proposals to the NPC. Moreover, policymakers may also look to further clarify targets and approaches for the slew of reforms launched in 2021, given that this has led to confusion among private businesses and low confidence about investment.  In particular, antitrust regulation in the internet sector makes it hard to accurately gauge the worth of the listed internet giants. As a result, their stocks underperformed in both onshore and offshore markets. If NPC policymakers can make the regulatory mechanisms more transparent, it could help restore investor confidence. For investors, the NPC will be a good time to re-evaluate China’s economic policy and reset their plans. The short-term stimulus measures could boost sentiment and reverse the weakness of Chinese stocks. Meanwhile, the reform and development plans will be key to providing clearer guidance for the longer term.

EU launches WTO case against China over Huawei, Xiaomi tech infringements
Brussels sues Beijing for allegedly penalising European firms for seeking to protect their patents from Chinese copyright theft in foreign courts   It follows a high-profile lawsuit over China’s alleged economic coercion of Lithuania, which was filed to the World Trade Organization last month

EU accuses China of ‘power grab’ over smartphone technology licensing
The EU is taking China to the World Trade Organization for alleged patent infringements that are costing companies billions of euros, as part of what officials in Brussels claim is a “power grab” by Beijing to set smartphone technology licensing rates. Businesses, including Sweden’s Ericsson, Finland’s Nokia and Sharp of Japan, have lost money after China’s supreme court banned them from litigating licence deals in foreign countries, the European Commission said. Chinese courts set licence fees at around half the market rate previously agreed between western technology providers and manufacturers such as Oppo, ZTE and Huawei, it added. “It is part of a global power grab by the Chinese government by legal means,” said a European Commission official. “It is a means to push Europe out.”

China signals more government support to stabilise economy, with a wary eye on debt ratio
Finance minister Liu Kun says Beijing must ‘shoulder the responsibility’ for steadying the economy, while setting an ‘appropriate deficit ratio’   China’s fiscal deficit ratio was lowered to 3.2 per cent last year, but some market analysts think it may have been even lower

Xi Jinping hasn’t left China in two years. Why?
Tristan Kenderdine on Xi’s challenges, and why China resembles a broken Linux machine Things in China do change very quickly. But a reinvigorated right, internationalist, liberal China seems a world away right now. Even if those domestic changes were to occur, there is a huge trust deficit which has developed over the past four years which will be incredibly difficult to overcome. Whatever the future of the Chinese leadership, the halcyon days of throwing money into China’s development economy are gone.

China’s economic policymakers expected to implement ‘more pro-growth policies’ after high-profile March meetings
China’s monetary authorities have already been supporting growth by cutting the reserve requirement ratio and by expanding access to credit for small businesses  Widening interest rate gap with the United States poses an economic risk to China, but Beijing has the tools to minimise the impact, according to analysts

China’s foreign listing regulations that mandate cybersecurity reviews apply to Hong Kong, experts say
The CAC has not officially clarified whether a listing in Hong Kong requires a cybersecurity review, but it posted the expert assessments on its website     New listings in Hong Kong are subject to the ‘relevant provisions of the security review’, even though the city was not mentioned in the law

China’s imposed cybersecurity review is result of US siphoning audit inspections of listed tech firms, analyst says
An opinion piece published by the China’s cyberspace watchdog argues that companies listing overseas risk having data ‘maliciously used by foreign governments’  Part of the concerns stem from a rule in the US that would require regulators to inspect audits of China-based companies, which could violate Chinese law

China’s climate stress test in carbon-intensive thermal power, steel, cement sectors highlights default risks
The People’s Bank of China completed the first phase of climate risk stress tests at 23 major banks last year     China’s banks face rising default risks as a result of higher climate-related costs in carbon-intensive sectors like thermal power, steel and cement, Liu Guiping, vice governor of the central bank, said in comments published on Friday. The People’s Bank of China completed the first phase of its climate risk stress tests at 23 major banks last year, focusing on the possibility that the three sectors would be forced to pay for their carbon emissions, Liu wrote in the bank’s China Finance publication.
“The test results showed that if enterprises in the thermal power, steel and cement sectors do not carry out low-carbon transformation, their repayment capability will decline to various degrees under the (different) stress scenarios,” he wrote. Rising emission costs as well as policies designed to facilitate “industrial substitution” would lead to the problem of stranded assets and other “transition risks”, he said. Liu said more tests would be conducted to ascertain banks’ exposure to other high-emission industrial sectors Rising emission costs as well as policies designed to facilitate ‘industrial substitution’ would lead to the problem of stranded assets and other ‘transition risks’   Though China has been transitioning to cleaner energy, its financial institutions have continued to provide support to fossil fuels, providing loans and underwriting services for the construction of new coal-fired power plants. It has pledged to end financial support for overseas coal-fired power plants, though it remains unclear if projects in the pipeline will go ahead.

Chinese directive asking on-demand platforms to lower merchant fees triggers sell off in Meituan shares in Hong Kong
The new guidelines, published by the National Development and Reform Commission, are aimed at helping the service sector recover from the impact of the pandemic   Chinese regulators have taken a tough stance on the country’s tech giants since last year

UPDATE: Latest China Data Protection Regulations for Industrial and Telecom Companies
Update: On February 10, 2022,
 the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) has begun soliciting opinions on the draft version of the Measures for the Administration of Data Security in the Field of Industrial and Information Technology sectors (Trial) (the “Measures”). The new draft contains amendments based on feedback from a previous draft that was first released in September 2021.  
The most notable amendment is the removal of the outright ban on exporting “core data” – something which industry stakeholders may have considered too stringent.  The MIIT will be soliciting opinions from the public on the new draft until February 21, 2022.

Alibaba and Tencent sites added to US ‘Notorious Markets List’
The US has added sites operated by Chinese technology giants Alibaba and Tencent to its “Notorious Markets List” of businesses it believes are involved with trading counterfeit goods.   The list identifies 42 online sites and 35 physical stores, including e-commerce platforms, run by the firms.

3,000 ‘little giants’ to make industrial sector more resilient, innovative
The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, China’s top industry regulator, said it aims to cultivate 3,000 “little giant “companies this year, which will help enhance the resilience of industrial chains and boost the innovation and vitality of the industrial economy.    The phrase “little giant” refers to small and medium-sized enterprises that focus on a market niche and master key technologies with a strong innovation capacity and big market share.

China NEV sales drop 18.6% in January after subsidy cut
Sales of new energy vehicles (NEVs) in China fell 18.6% month-on-month in January after the country cut subsidies for NEVs by 30%, industry data showed on Friday.–39510663

China adopts measures to reinforce foreign trade supply chains
China will adopt multiple measures to reinforce foreign trade supply chains to cope with raw material price hikes and supply constraints, the Ministry of Commerce (MOC) said on Thursday.  The MOC will guide enterprises to make use of the preferential policies, enhance international cooperation to establish trade channels for raw materials with mutual benefits and reduced costs, MOC spokesperson Gao Feng told a press conference.  The ministry will continue to optimize China’s business environment along with relevant departments, further implement tax and fee cuts and crack down on arbitrary charges to support the development of foreign trade companies, Gao said. China’s total goods imports and exports expanded 21.4 percent year on year to 39.1 trillion yuan ($6.17 trillion) in 2021, official data shows.

Soros Casts Shade On China’s Economy In Most Tantalizing Way
Investors don’t tend to make a lot of money betting against China’s economy. The financial pages are littered with tales of short-sellers who bet big against Asia’s biggest economy and lost even bigger. Yet when George Soros trains his infamous skepticism China’s way, it’s worth exploring what the billionaire investor is on about. Granted, anytime the 91-year-old says a crisis is imminent, it’s going to make headlines. The “man who broke the Bank of England” back in 1992, and made more $1 billion doing it, tends to be the last person a government wants wagering against it. All this deepens concerns about developers’ financial health at the same time gyrations in China’s high-yield dollar bonds flag investment algorithms everywhere. And a moment when Soros pointing out China’s recovery from the Covid-19 era looks fine on the macroeconomic level—not at the micro level. Looking under China Inc.’s hood is becoming harder and harder. Again, the last decade is awash in cautionary tales. A warning 12 years ago from hedge fund manager Jim Chanos that China is “on a treadmill to hell” doesn’t seem to have aged well. The same with Hayman Capital Management’s Kyle Bass predicting a 30% yuan devaluation in 2016. Money managers David Tepper and Bill Ackman have their own stories to tell. And an old hedge-fund hand like Soros ringing the alarm bell doesn’t mean China’s “Minsky moment,” when a debt-fuel boom crashes, is here. Yet Soros is saying something truly tantalizing: even though Xi “has many tools” to fix China’s troubles, there’s a very open question about whether he will use them properly. Beijing spent the last 15 months increasing control over property, tech and other sectors, not building a freer and more vibrant private sector or tolerating the media the way China had the courage to do in 2008. We can debate what path this puts China on for the next 15 months—or the coming 15 years. But Soros can’t help but think the China bears are about to have their moment.

Chinese financial services regulator raises alert on growing metaverse-related scams, illegal fundraising amid market frenzy
The China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission said criminals are now getting involved in various metaverse investment projects and blockchain games   The warning comes at a time when the metaverse has become popular with Chinese technology companies and a growing number of investors

How Xi Jinping will control the ‘Sinoverse’
China’s virtual reality world will extend to everyday life restrictions   While infinitely customizable cosplay-like avatars will help users depart from their real-world selves, they will not have the anonymity offered by blockchain-based decentralized autonomous organizations such as Decentraland. China will surely maintain the real-name registration rules from its Web 2 platforms, thus ensuring that authorities can surveil every user behind their virtual guise.   And then there is the enormous potential for domestic propaganda spectacles — yes, People’s Liberation Army parades can get bigger, as will foreign influence operations that will no longer be limited to the physical people Beijing can co-opt on the ground.  Donning avatars, Chinese spies will mingle with American executives in Microsoft and Meta’s virtual boardrooms, gathering intelligence that will be increasingly transmitted via, and created in, metaverse spaces, although U.S. intelligence agencies will doubtless be doing the same thing in the Sinoverse.  It is a brave new world, but one that feels strangely familiar. For all the transformative flux that new metaverse technologies are sure to bring, Beijing’s grip on the Sinoverse will remain constant. That, at least, Xi can live with.

Chip talent war: Taiwan faces critical staffing shortage
Semiconductor giants hike salaries to lure island’s dwindling number of graduates    “Talent shortage is a pressing issue, and we must embrace workers from overseas,” he said. “I hope to bring in more engineering professionals from Southeast Asia, mainly Malaysia.”  “If we are recruiting 1,000 people, that means we need to read at least 10,000 CVs,” said Poling Liu, ASML’s regional director of human resources for Taiwan and Southeast Asia. “That’s a lot of pressure for HR, too. We need to also look at talents from other Southeast Asian nations.”  Advantech’s Ho said with other major economies working to build up their chip supply chains, the talent war will only escalate. “We should be happy to see so many companies hunting for talent in Taiwan. Foreign companies’ increased investment and R&D in Taiwan, which push up the local salary base, is overall a positive thing to the economy,” he said. “Every industry needs to be more competitive.”

Will This Be the Century of Youthful Asia?
One of the key opportunities that youthful Asia can offer to investors is in manufacturing. In the context of the strategic competition between the U.S. and China, the risks of having a China-centric global supply chain makes youthful Asia particularly appealing. China’s very fast increase in wages compared to youthful Asia adds to the appeal. Given the already quite high average manufacturing wages, China’s labor intensive manufacturing still makes up a staggering 32% of global total labor-intensive manufacturing exports.  Youthful Asia offers immense opportunities for investors, but such potential can only be realized if their infrastructure and energy needs are fulfilled.  All in all, youthful Asia offers immense opportunities for investors, but such potential can only be realized if their infrastructure and energy needs are fulfilled. The latter will be particularly difficult since it requires a major transformation in the energy basket and massive financing. In this context, India offers the largest opportunities but has the widest gap in infrastructure and energy needs. For this story to be a success, Indian authorities will need to make infrastructure and energy transition key priorities.

China’s CPTPP trade-pact aspirations bring vows for reform as Beijing reaches out to members
But analysts say Beijing’s bid to join Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership may be a tough sell among some members   Application to join Digital Economy Partnership Agreement could also see China play a more active role in the world’s digital economy

How China Beat Out the U.S. to Dominate South America
No province is too small or remote for Beijing’s careful attention.  It’s no secret that China has been pouring resources into South America this century, chipping away at the U.S.’s historic dominance and making itself the continent’s No. 1 trading partner. But while international focus has turned in recent years to China’s ventures in Africa and Asia, an important shift has gone largely unnoticed in the country’s approach to South America: going local to expand and strengthen its financial grip. Instead of focusing on national leaders, China and its companies have built relationships from the ground up. In 2019 alone, at least eight Brazilian governors and four deputy governors traveled to China. In a September 2019 speech, Zou Xiaoli, China’s ambassador to Argentina, said his country’s infrastructure push was helping weave Latin America into the global marketplace. “China will lend strong support to Argentina’s economic and social development,” he said.  The contrast between Jujuy’s past and present is striking. The province is building a hub to spur lithium-related manufacturing right outside San Salvador, in the dying steel town of Palpala. New, shiny warehouses sit on overgrown land, in the shadow of the rusting steelworks and its cracked cooling tower. Back in the capital city, on a recent weekday, vendors hawked bric-a-brac out of stalls by an old bus terminal. The new foreign influence seemed to both bemuse and worry them. “At this rate we’re all going to become Chinese,” says Mirtha Ramos, a 49-year-old mother of three who was selling fake designer caps. Nancy Ortega, 31, working at the next stall, adds, “I have a friend up in the mines who said the Chinese are taking over everything.

How Chinese firms have dominated African infrastructure
Western firms grumble more but compete less China’s involvement in African infrastructure has not been an unalloyed good. In some cases it has left countries drowning in debt, fuelled domestic corruption or produced infrastructure that, like Kenya’s railway, will never turn a profit. But long after the scandals have faded—and debts have been defaulted on—China’s legacy will be the roads and ports that Africa so badly needs for economic growth.  Perhaps as important is that China is unwittingly crowding in Western money by stoking the geopolitical anxieties of Western leaders. Britain’s government recently said its development arm would invest $1bn in Kenyan infrastructure and that a British firm would build a new rail hub in central Nairobi. The g7 group of countries last year launched the Build Back Better World initiative, a shameless copy of China’s BRI. All this should mean more opportunities for construction firms of all nationalities, whether Western, Chinese or,with a bit of luck, African, too

Strategic Geopolitics and Bangladesh
The United States has called on India to increase military cooperation with China, Vietnam, the Philippines, and the Pacific, as well as Japan, Australia, and South Asia in the South China Sea. During the epidemic, we saw the vaccine diplomacy of the superpowers. The United States, India, and China have donated millions of doses of the COVID-19 vaccine to South Asian countries.   China has already emerged as a major player in South Asian geopolitics. China, however, is not a South Asian country like India, but China’s interest in South Asian geopolitics is growing. They want to rein in India’s hegemony in South Asia. To this end, China has been making efforts for several years, and in almost all the countries of South Asia, China is participating in the development of countries through economic assistance and investment. Using its economic power, China has been able to build warm relations with almost all countries in South Asia. They plan to build an emergency vaccine platform in South Asia with Myanmar, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka to address the crisis.

Why China Will Not Support a Russian Invasion of Ukraine
The reputational cost – both on the international stage and with the Chinese people – would be great if Beijing threw its support behind Russian aggression.   Not long ago, a U.S. research institution suggested that China has a “silent majority” who do not like Chinese government policy, which is consistent with my observation. In my view, these people are not all anti-government or anarchists, but more silent dissenters who subtly boycott the overly nationalist atmosphere in today’s society.  The Chinese government must know this as well. When making policies, it will consider the attitudes of as many people as possible and satisfy the interests of the most possible people, in order to smooth the way for domestic social management.   With that in mind, it’s important to know that most Chinese have mixed views about Russia; some are outright negative. After all, Russia was one of the European powers that encroached on China during the “century of humiliation.” For many Chinese people, when the see the Ukraine crisis, they think of Russia’s territorial expansion into China more than 100 years ago. You will never see this point raised in the state media, but you can find it easily on Chinese social media. Many people comment on the Weibo page of the Russian embassy in China, asking Russia to return Haishenwai (Vladivostok in Russian) to China. As the crisis in Ukraine deepens, many Chinese netizens accuse Russia of being an aggressor. In this context, should China’s government support Russia in invading Ukraine, it will make more Chinese people doubt the justice and legitimacy of their own government, which is not good for maintaining social stability. Russian diplomats are well aware of this strain of Chinese public opinion. They treat it calmly and only emphasize Sino-Russian friendship. It shows that both China and Russia have left some flexibility and maneuvering space for each other. Beijing and Moscow understand they will not always be completely in lock-step. It’s time for Washington to grasp this point as well

China blames US-led Nato for tensions on Russian border with Ukraine
‘Nato enlargement is an issue that cannot be overlooked’, China’s permanent UN envoy tells Security Council    China supports all efforts conducive to easing the tensions, Zhang Jun tells meeting on Ukraine situation

Coronavirus: China bans unauthorised lockdowns to support ‘in difficulty’ services sector
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) instructs all regional authorities to not impose any unauthorised citywide or district-wide lockdowns  It also urges local governments not to shut down or extend the closure of restaurants, supermarkets, scenic spots and cinemas without investigation or a policy basis

China’s Insistence on ‘Zero COVID’ in Hong Kong Has a Deeper Meaning
Beijing’s attack on Hong Kong’s elite may have consequences that outlast the pandemic.    Finally, and most ominously, the attack on the Hong Kong elite signals that a Xinjiang-style rectification of local officials is not outside the realm of possibilities. As part of China’s wholesale restructuring of society in Xinjiang – with an estimated 1 million people put in extralegal detention, children sent to Mandarin-education orphanages, and Han cadres visiting the homes of Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim minorities – the government also carried out a campaign to clean out so-called “two-faced” Uyghur cadres and intellectuals. This has targeted people who allegedly profess loyalty to the CCP, but are accused of having sympathies for Uyghur history and culture – easily conflated in CCP logic with “separatism.” Many Uyghurs cadres have been detained or fired as a result. To some extent, however, the Xinjiang “two-faced” campaign reflects an outgrowth of China’s move away from the relative cultural pluralism that once was permitted. Instead, China is in the middle of a much more homogeneous and assimilationist push toward a singular ethnic and linguistic identity under Xi Jinping. This trend has been evident in education across Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Tibetan areas, where there is now a much greater push toward a politicized education using only Mandarin. Negating even the already limited tolerance and respect previously shown for China’s various ethnicities, Xi has emphasized forging a “a collective consciousness of the Zhonghua ethnicity” as the main line of ethnic work in his “New Era.” According to this strand of thinking, implicitly, local officials with different linguistic traditions, histories, and ways of thinking from those of the northern Chinese heartland simply cannot be trusted – including Hong Kongers. Now, mirroring that language on divided loyalties, Beijing voices have not only accused the Hong Kong elites of dual loyalties to the West – with almost no evidence – but they have also explicitly invoked the “two-faced” terminology. Tian Feilong said that in light of this “two-faced-ness… simply criticizing is not enough” and that there are problems with the Hong Kong government and society that needed to be resolved through “support” and “guidance.”
Of course, it remains to be seen whether a “two-faced” campaign on the scale of Xinjiang could ever be launched in Hong Kong. But, with many opposition politicians detained, more than 50 civil society organizations closed down, and the free press curtailed, Hong Kong’s pro-Beijing elite may find that they are next on the chopping block.

China’s zero-Covid policy aids economy, limits ‘destructive power’ of lifting curbs, watchdog says
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) says China’s existing policies have proved cost-effective by isolating affected communities     China has maintained a zero-tolerance approach, but some analysts have forecast a decline in economic growth this year   “Even with a more targeted approach, the simple fact of more transmissible variants means that China is likely to have to stay pretty stringent,” said Michael Hirson, China head of the Eurasia Group consultancy, which has launched an index measuring the economic impact of zero-Covid policies.  “It means a recovery that’s more driven by industry and investment and less driven by consumption and services, which are a cleaner form of growth.” ANZ said this week that China’s supply chain problems were not caused by its zero-Covid strategy and had originated overseas. But although China’s approach was “not as restrictive as perceived”, with its more localised measures helping to reduce the economic impact, service sectors continued to struggle, the bank said in a note.

‘No light at the end’: How Hong Kong’s Covid response went so wrong
A policy of admitting every positive case to hospital means thousands are being added to an already huge backlog every day   “At the moment the pressure is from not being able to admit and discharge mild cases quickly enough,” Cowling says. “But in a couple of weeks I fear the pressure is going to come from having too many patients with severe Covid and not with the resources to manage them.”     The spread has slowed a little. Cases in Hong Kong are doubling every three days compared to every 1.5 to 2 in other countries, but it’s not slow enough.   In the meantime the government is still committed to elimination. On Tuesday Lam declared that “surrendering to the virus” was not an option. On Wednesday’s front pages of local pro-Beijing papers Xi Jinping called on her to grasp the “overriding mission” of controlling the outbreak.    Having bet the house on prevention, Hong Kong’s authorities are now faced with a potentially insurmountable task.   “I’m not sure there was a failure to prepare for this type of scenario as there was a failure to anticipate the potential for this type of scenario,” says Cowling.

Buyers wanted for the world’s biggest cruise ship before builder’s cash runs out
The Global Dream was reported to cost US$1.8 billion to build, and lenders had financed about €1.4 billion euros (US$1.6 billion) for the ship’s construction    The shipyard will still need between €500 million and €600 million to finish it

5 notable pieces of Chinese tech at the 2022 Winter Olympics
As Beijing prepares to close the 2022 Winter Olympics, TechNode selects five notable pieces of technology built by Chinese companies that left an impression during the two-week games. Two Chinese display manufacturers, Leyard and BOE, supplied the floor display screen for the opening ceremony. BOE also provided power-saving athlete nametags. Baidu Cloud and other startups developed a virtual host to translate sign language. Alibaba Cloud provided high-definition panoramic footage for selected games. Remote-controlled beds built by Chinese company Keeson became a social media hit during the game, while iFlytek provided live translation services with a 95% accuracy rate.

Olympic skier Eileen Gu sparks a debate about dual nationality
China does not allow it. But there may be loopholes  “I’m american when I’m in the us, and I’m Chinese when I’m in China.” So Eileen Gu, a gold-medal-winner for Team China at the Beijing Winter Olympics, replied when asked if she was still an American citizen. Ms Gu, born and raised in America, is a superstar in China. But many Chinese are puzzled. China does not recognise dual nationality. Questions about whether she holds two passports have fuelled debate about whether China should change its strict citizenship rules.      The issue has become important for many people in China. Millions of Chinese have moved abroad and many have gained foreign citizenship; others have acquired it by making investments. By law, this results in automatic forfeiture of Chinese citizenship. But many people keep quiet about their foreign nationality to avoid having to give up their citizenship rights. Having a Chinese identity card—available only to citizens—makes living and working in China much easier.

Patient in Denmark diagnosed by doctor in Chongqing
A doctor in Chongqing, China, and a patient in Denmark used 5G technology recently for remote diagnosis of an unknown chronic disease. In January, professor Li Qi in the neurology department of First Affiliated Hospital of Chongqing Medical University received an email from a patient in Denmark. The patient, identified as Sabrina (alias), wrote that she had sought medical treatment in several European countries, including Denmark, Germany and France, over a number of years. But her condition continued to worsen, as the cause could not be found. A neurologist in France thought Sabrina’s disease involved vertebral artery compression syndrome (VACS), a rare disease first defined by Li, the doctor in Chongqing. The patient decided to contact Li directly and request a remote consultation.

Don’t Cede the Space Race to China and the Billionaires
Mr. Nelson cites an “aggressive” China as a reason for Americans to “get off our duff,” but a few national security questions require a fuller airing. What if, for example, China stakes out strategic positions on the moon? What if it asserts control over the resources it and other nations are searching for there: silicon, titanium and, not least, the water that is needed to sustain a human settlement? As Namrata Goswami, an expert on China’s space policy, has argued, “An advantage in accessing the vast wealth of the inner solar system could have an effect on the balance of power” on Earth.

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